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ively debates over the future of the nation-state resurfaced in the 1980s
as scholars and politicians began to suggest that it was now too small
to solve the world’s big problems and too big to solve its little ones.
Among the most frequently cited problems were: (1) the rise of an un-
controlled and possibly uncontrollable global capitalism, (2) the emer-
gence of a global risk society, (3) the challenge to national politics from
the politics of identity and new social movements based on local and/or
transnational issues; and, more recently, (4) the threat of new forms of
terrorism and decentralized network warfare. But there is little agreement
about what these problems mean for the state – especially as such chal-
lenges are politically constructed and contested. Prognoses include the
rise of a single global Empire; a western conglomerate state centered on
the United States; a series of supranational states modeled on the Euro-
pean Union; the rise of a fragmented neo-medieval state system; a shift
from largely state-based government to network-based governance; the
re-scaling of the powers of the national state upwards, downwards, or
outwards; and minor incremental changes in secondary aspects of the na-
tion-state that leave its primary features intact. This paper reviews some
major changes in the postwar state in advanced capitalist societies and re-
lates them to other changes, including the increasing integration of the
world market. But it first offers six clarifications regarding what is really
at stake in the debate over globalization and the future of the state.
Six Clarifications
First, all forms of state are based on the territorialization of political
power. A formally sovereign national state exercising control over a large
territorial area is only a relatively recent institutional expression of state
power. It results from a specific, socially constructed division of the glo-
bal political order into many territorially exclusive, mutually recognizing,
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mutually legitimating, sovereign states. Other modes of organizing
political power on a territorial basis existed before the rise of this West-
phalian system (e.g., city-states, the medieval state system, and traditional
empires); and other modes have co-existed with it and/or may be super-
seding it (e.g., modern imperial-colonial blocs, supranational alliances
such as the European Union, or complex post-national polities associa-
tions with variable geometries). Thus, even if we accept that globalization
challenges the national state as one mode of territorialization of political
power, it does not follow that political power will cease to assume some
territorial form or another. Indeed, rather than simply withering away or
being entirely superseded by non-territorial forms of organizing political
power (e.g., a series of global or international regimes addressed to
specific functional problems), the evidence points to continuing attempts
to redesign and/or rescale territorial statehood in response to current
challenges. 
Second, we should distinguish between the national state and the na-
tion-state. The territorial organization of power long preceded nation-
formation and, whereas territorial statehood is now almost universal,
nation-statehood is not. The latter can also have different, potentially
overlapping, sometimes antagonistic bases. These include ethnic identity,
based on a socially constructed ethnonational community (e.g., Ger-
many); a cultural nation based on a shared national culture that may well
be defined and actively promoted by the state itself (e.g., France); and a
civic nation based on patriotic commitment to the constitution and belief
in the legitimacy of representative government (e.g., the usa). These
three forms can reinforce each other (e.g., Denmark), be combined in a
hybrid multinational state (e.g., mainland Britain), or provoke conflicts
over the proper basis of the nation-state (e.g., Canada, New Zealand).
Pressures exist to grant significant autonomy to regionally-based national
minorities (e.g., Spain) or institute »consociational« forms of govern-
ment to share power between nations in a given state (e.g., Belgium, New
Zealand). Initially, then, we should consider how these challenges affect
the national state form rather than different forms of »nation-state«. 
Third, addressing the future of national and/or nation-states requires
us to look beyond the state. The latter does not normally exist in majestic
isolation overseeing its own society but is more or less embedded in a
wider political system, other institutional orders, and civil society. Thus
state transformation involves the redrawing of the multiple »lines of dif-
ference« between the state and its environment(s) as states (and the social
32 Jessop, The Future of the State ipg 3/2003
forces they represent) redefine their priorities, expand or reduce their ac-
tivities, rescale them in the light of new challenges, modify the relation
between different branches and apparatuses, seek greater autonomy or
develop forms of power-sharing, and disembed or re-embed specific state
institutions and practices within the social order. This holds for the inter-
national as well as national dimensions of state relations. 
Even the dominant, neo-liberal form of globalization continues to 
depend heavily on state institutions and practices at many different 
territorial scales.
Fourth, and relatedly, even in the most liberal economies, states are ac-
tively involved in shaping economic life. There is no absolute institu-
tional separation between the political (the domain of the state) and the
economic (the domain of the market). The market economy is also em-
bedded in an ensemble of extra-economic institutions and practices that
are essential for its operation. The state plays a key role here not only in
securing the general institutional framework for profit-oriented, market-
mediated economic activities but also in shaping their specific forms, or-
ganization, and overall dynamic. This is reflected in growing academic
and practical interest in the intimate relation between forms of state and
political regime and »varieties of capitalism« and in the various comple-
mentarities and contradictions among these different local and national
varieties within a changing global economy. Thus even the dominant,
neo-liberal form of globalization continues to depend heavily on state in-
stitutions and practices at many different territorial scales and in many
different functional areas and on the survival of other ways of organizing
capital accumulation both within and beyond the dominant neo-liberal
economies.
Fifth, globalization is not a single causal mechanism with a universal,
unitary logic but is multicentric, multiscalar, multitemporal, multiform,
and multicausal. It is better seen as a hypercomplex, continuously evolv-
ing product of many processes. As such it does not generate a single, uni-
form set of pressures on all states but affects them in different ways. In-
deed, it is not the State as such (sovereign or otherwise) that is pressured
by globalization (or other challenges). For the many social forces and
mechanisms that generate globalization can only exert pressure on – or,
indeed, strengthen – particular forms of state with particular state ca-
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pacities and liabilities. Moreover, in so doing, they modify the balance of
forces within states and create space for, and prompt, struggles to reor-
ganize state forms and capacities in order to meet these challenges. 
Sixth, and consequently, questions about globalization and the state
should not be posed in zero-sum terms. At its worse, this involves an un-
tenable contrast between a singular, emergent, borderless flow-based
economy able to operate globally in real time and a plurality of formally
equivalent traditional national territorial states qua »power containers«
that operate within defined territorial frontiers and according to heavily
time-consuming political routines. This contrast errs in two ways. On the
one hand, it misrepresents the actual complexities of globalization, ig-
nores the extent to which it depends on changing place-based competi-
tive advantages, neglects the general dependence of economic activities
on extra-economic supports that are place- and time-bound, and, of
course, overstates the extent of the global economy, even in regard to
financial capital, let alone industrial and commercial capital. It also
ignores the significant degree to which the unfolding economic logic
(and illogic) of globalization constrains individual firms, branches, and
clusters as well as the operations of the political system. On the other
hand, despite the formal equivalence among sovereign states in the mod-
ern state system, as signified, for example, by membership of the United
Nations, not all states are equally capable of exercising power internally
and/or internationally. They face different problems at home and abroad;
have different histories; have different capacities to address these prob-
lems and reorganize themselves in response in international as well as do-
mestic matters. Moreover, just as the economy has important territorial
dimensions (reflected in concepts such as industrial districts, agglomera-
tion economies, global cities, and regional or national capitalisms), so
states also operate as power connectors within various global systems as
well as power containers. And, while not even the usa has an effective glo-
bal reach and the ability to compress its routines to match those of hyper-
mobile capital, many states have proved capable of reorganizing their
routines to modify the impact of economic processes.
Given these arguments, we should focus on the changing organization
of politics and economics and their respective institutional embodiments
and see frontiers and borders as actively reproduced and contingent rather
than as pregiven and fixed. I will illustrate this approach by exploring: 
 changes in the form of postwar state typical of postwar western capi-
talist economies; 
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 broad changes in six key dimensions of the state; and 
 the temporal pressures currently facing the state and its responses
thereto.
The Keynesian National Welfare State
This essay cannot consider recent changes in all forms of state in the in-
terstate system. Instead it focuses on changes in the Keynesian national
welfare state (or knws). This is the form of state that became dominant
in North Western Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand
during the 1950s to 1970s and that was closely linked with the postwar
Fordist growth dynamic based on mass production and mass consump-
tion. Obviously, there are important differences among the states in these
countries but there are enough similarities to justify describing them in
terms of an ideal-typical (or stylized) state form. Each term in this four-
dimensional ideal type refers to a major aspect of state involvement in se-
curing continued capitalist expansion and, in this sense, it interprets the
state from a broadly economic perspective. This is not the only way to ex-
amine changes in the state; adopting alternative entrypoints would high-
light other aspects of state transformation or, indeed, reveal some conti-
nuities in state forms. But my approach does provide a benchmark for as-
sessing some key recent changes.
First, in promoting the conditions for profitable economic growth,
the knws was distinctively Keynesian insofar as it aimed to secure full em-
ployment in a relatively closed national economy and did so mainly
through demand-side management and nationwide infrastructural pro-
vision. Second, in contributing to the day-to-day, lifetime, and intergen-
erational reproduction of the population, knws social policy had a dis-
tinctive welfare orientation insofar as it (a) instituted economic and social
rights for all citizens so that they could share in growing prosperity (and
contribute to high levels of demand) even if they were not employed in
the high-wage, high-growth Fordist economic sectors; and (b) promoted
forms of collective consumption favorable to the Fordist growth dy-
namic. Third, the knws was national insofar as these economic and social
policies were pursued within the historically distinctive matrix of a na-
tional economy, a national state, and a society seen as comprising national
citizens. Within this nationally-organized matrix it was the national ter-
ritorial state that was mainly held responsible for developing and guiding
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Keynesian welfare policies. Local and regional states acted mainly as re-
lays for policies framed at the national level; and the leading international
regimes established after World War II were mainly intended to restore
stability to national economies and national states. And, fourth, the
knws was statist insofar as state institutions (on different levels) were the
chief supplement and corrective to market forces in a »mixed economy«
concerned with economic growth and social integration.
Whereas denationalization concerns the territorial dispersion of the 
national state’s activities, destatization redraws the »public-private« 
divide and modifies the relationship between organizations and tasks 
across this divide on whatever territorial scale(s).
There was never a pure knws. It assumed different national forms
within the broader international framework of Atlantic Fordism. This is
reflected in distinctions between, for example, Germany’s »flexi-Ford-
ism«, France’s statist Fordism, and Sweden’s social democratic Fordism.
Nor has there been a generic crisis that affects all national cases in the
same way. Nonetheless, they have all faced similar pressures. The first
signs of crisis in Fordist growth emerged in the mid-1970s and worsened
in the 1980s. In addition, the structured coherence of a nationally-scaled
economy-state-society was weakened by changes associated with glo-
balization, internationalization, the rise of multi-tiered global city net-
works, the formation of triad economies (such as European Economic
Space), and the re-emergence of regional and local economies. The unity
of nation-states (as opposed to national states) has also been weakened
by the (admittedly uneven) growth of multiethnic and multicultural so-
cieties and of divided political loyalties (with the resurgence of regional-
ism and nationalism as well as the rise of European identities, diasporic
networks, cosmopolitan patriotism, etc.). Because many of these
changes are not directly related to globalization, we should not focus
one-sidedly on the latter as the decisive causal mechanism in recent po-
litical transformation.
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Six Trends in the Restructuring 
of the Keynesian National Welfare State
Taking the postwar knws as our benchmark, the current reorganization
of the state and its capacities can be summarized in terms of six analy-
tically distinct but empirically interrelated trends. Each trend is also
linked to a countertrend that both qualifies and transforms its signi-
ficance for the state’s form and functions. These countertrends can be
viewed initially as specific reactions to the new trends rather than as sur-
vivals of earlier patterns. This is why they are presented as countertrends
rather than as additional trends.
Denationalization of Statehood 
This involves the transfer of powers previously located at the national ter-
ritorial level upwards to supra-regional or international bodies, down-
wards to regional or local states, or outwards to relatively autonomous
cross-national alliances among local, metropolitan or regional states with
potentially complementary interests. In addition, new state powers have
been allocated to scales other than the national. This re-allocation of spe-
cific state powers weakens national states qua mutually exclusive, for-
mally sovereign, spatially segmented instantiations of the modern inter-
state system. Given the primacy of the national scale in the knws, this
trend is sometimes termed the »hollowing out« of the national state. But
this is misleading because it focuses on the transfer of specific tasks, ig-
nores the assumption of new tasks by the national state, and, above all,
overlooks the real extent to which this re-arrangement of state functions
may be undertaken by state managers to enhance their operational auton-
omies and strategic capacities. 
De- and Re-Statization
This involves redrawing the boundaries between state and non-state
apparatuses and activities within the political system. Whereas denation-
alization concerns the territorial dispersion of the national state’s activi-
ties, destatization redraws the »public-private« divide and modifies the
relationship between organizations and tasks across this divide on what-
ever territorial scale(s) the state in question acts. In other words, some of
the particular activities (technical, economic, fisco-financial, juridico-
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political, ideological, etc.) performed by states (on any scale) have been
transferred entirely to, or shared with, parastatal, non-governmental,
commercial, or not-for-profit actors, institutional arrangements or re-
gimes. This is often described as a shift from government to governance
but this slogan is misleading insofar as it depicts the shift as unidirect-
ional. For there is also reverse traffic as states on different scales undertake
new tasks that were previously undertaken, if at all, by the market or civil
society. Overall, this trend involves the increased importance of quite
varied forms (and levels) of public-private partnerships in managing eco-
nomic and social relations. The state is often only first among equals in
these relations. This blurs the division between public and private, ex-
pands and reinforces the principle of subsidiarity, strengthens the infor-
mal sector as well as private enterprise (especially in delivering welfare
and collective consumption), and reinforces mechanisms such as »regu-
lated self-regulation« and »private interest government«. It is also linked
to the state’s growing involvement in decentered societal guidance strat-
egies based on growing recognition of functional interdependencies, the
division of knowledge, and the need for mutual learning, reflexivity and
negotiated coordination. This need not entail a loss in the overall power
of government, however, because resort to governance could enhance the
state’s capacity to project its influence and secure its objectives by mobi-
lizing knowledge and power resources from influential non-governmen-
tal partners or stakeholders.
The Retreat of the State
This involves the rise of modes of exercising political power that are for-
mally independent of state borders, even if re-scaled. This process weak-
ens territorial »power containers« on any and all scales relative to non-
territorial forms of political power. As such it is often subsumed under
the shift from government to governance but it is distinctive because it
dissociates the exercise of political power from imagined political
communities whose interests are tied to territorialized state power. De-
statization involves public-private partnerships in which the state de-
volves responsibilities to the private sphere but attempts to remain
primus inter pares. In contrast, this trend involves the self-organization
of functional forms of power that by-pass or circumvent state power –
perhaps at the behest of state managers. The increasing importance of in-
ternational regimes for the relative stabilization of a globalizing economy
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and the rise of networks in an extra-territorial cyberspace that is allegedly
beyond state control are two contrasting examples of this third trend. 
Re-articulating the Economic and Extra-Economic
The division of labor between the political and economic systems is being
redefined to take account of changed understandings of the economy and
the conditions that make for sound economic performance. The econ-
omy is no longer interpreted in narrow terms but now includes many ad-
ditional factors, deemed »non-economic« under the knws regime, that
affect economic competitiveness. This is reflected in ideas such as »struc-
tural competitiveness« (the oecd), »systemic competitiveness«,1 or the
»competitive advantage of nations«.2 It requires attention to a growing
range of social practices, institutions, functional systems, and domains of
civil society that affect competitiveness. This has two interesting and par-
adoxical effects on states and politics. First, whilst it expands the potential
scope of state intervention for economic purposes, the resulting complex-
ity renders the typical postwar forms of top-down intervention less effec-
tive – requiring that the state retreat from some areas of intervention and
redesign its institutional forms and functions in order to intervene more
effectively in other areas. And, second, whilst it increases the range of
stakeholders whose cooperation is required for successful state interven-
tion, it also increases pressures within the state to create new subjects to
act as its partners. Thus states are now trying to transform the identities,
interests, capacities, rights, and responsibilities of economic and social
forces so that they become more flexible, capable, and reliable agents of
the state’s new economic strategies – whether in partnership with the
state and/or each other or as autonomous entrepreneurial subjects in the
new knowledge-based economy.
Re-Ordering Political Hierarchies
Political hierarchies are also being re-ordered. The nested hierarchy of
state power within territorially exclusive sovereign states and formal
equality among such states was never fully realized in the modern inter-
state system; but it did provide the institutional framework within which
1. Messner, D. (1996) Die Netzwerkgesellschaft, Köln: Weltforum Verlag.
2. Porter, M. (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
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forces struggled to control state power and/or modify the balance of in-
ternational forces. Many of the above changes weaken the coherence of
this nested hierarchy and produce increasing unstructured complexity as
different scales of economic and political organization proliferate and dif-
ferent strategies are pursued to link them. This is reflected in the interna-
tionalization of policy regimes. This means that the international context
of domestic state action (whether national, regional or local) has ex-
panded to include a widening range of extraterritorial or transnational
factors and processes; that the international context has become more
significant strategically for domestic policy; and that key players in policy
regimes have expanded to include foreign agents and institutions as
sources of policy ideas, policy design and implementation. This trend af-
fects local and regional states below the national level as well as suprana-
tional state formations and international regimes. It is also evident in the
development of the interregional and cross-border linkages connecting
local and regional authorities and governance regimes in different na-
tional formations. 
Re-Imagining Political Communities
The political communities (or publics) around which forces in the polit-
ical system orient their actions are being re-imagined in various ways.
Among them are new »imagined nations« seeking autonomy within and/
or control of a defined territory below, above, or transversal to existing
national states; a global civil society based on cosmopolitan patriotism,
the primacy of human rights over national citizenship, or some other glo-
bal identity; new »communities of fate« defined by shared risks regardless
of specific territorial location and, perhaps, global in character (e.g., glo-
bal warming); and new communities of interest defined by shared iden-
tities, interests, and values regardless of specific territorial location (e.g.,
cybercommunities). Such new territorial or extra-territorial conceptions
of political community are linked to struggles to redefine the nature and
purposes of the state, find alternatives to territorialized forms of political
power, and redefine the imagined general interest which political power,
whether territorial or not, should serve. 
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Some Countertrends
Countering the denationalization of statehood and the re-ordering of po-
litical hierarchies are the continuing attempts of national states to control
the relation between different spatial scales and the transfer of powers be-
tween them. It might seem that little has changed here but the denation-
alization of statehood has introduced two major discontinuities. First, it
enhances the need for supranational coordination and opens the space for
subnational resurgence. And, second, it radically extends the scope for
national states to mediate between an increasing number of significant
scales of action. Thus, while the national state may have lost some formal
sovereignty through the rescaling of state powers, it seeks to play a central
role in interscalar articulation. This is especially clear in the complex poli-
tics of the European Union as the most advanced form of a new supra-
national political system in which national states regularly engage in
meta-constitutional deliberation about the appropriate competencies
and the appropriate balance of powers between different apparatuses and
levels of government and governance in relation to their substantive eco-
nomic, political, and socio-cultural objectives. In addition, national states
have an important role in producing and regulating extra-territorial
spaces, such as offshore financial centers, export-processing zones, the
»flagging out« of merchant shipping, and tax havens. They are also in-
volved in developing the new lex mercatoria governing international eco-
nomic relations in the effort to benefit their own economic spaces. The
same holds for the governance of cyberspace and its new lex cybertoria. 
Nor does the dual shift from government to governance included in
the second and third trends noted above make the state redundant. It re-
tains an important role precisely because of these trends. It is not only an
important actor in many individual governance mechanisms but also at-
tempts to manage these mechanisms in the light of the overall balance of
forces and demands of social cohesion. These attempts can be described
in terms of a shift from government to meta-governance. Even as states
cede their claim to formal juridical sovereignty in the face of growing
complexity and interdependence among different functional systems and
seek to enhance their political capacities by participating in public-private
partnerships and/or delegating public responsibilities to private institu-
tions and actors, they are also becoming more involved in organizing and
steering the self-organization of partnerships, networks and governance
regimes. This shift from governance to metagovernance should not be
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confused with the survival of state sovereignty as the highest instance of
government nor with the emergence of a »megapartnership« that sub-
sumes all other partnerships. Instead, it involves a shift from the top-
down political organization typical of sovereign states to an emphasis on
steering multiple agencies, institutions and systems that are operationally
autonomous from one another and yet coupled through reciprocal inter-
dependence. Thus states are increasingly involved in facilitating collective
learning about functional linkages and material interdependencies
among different sites and spheres of action. And politicians are develop-
ing the shared visions that can link complementary forms of governance
and maximize their effectiveness. States undertake such tasks not only to
promote particular state functions but also to ensure political stability and
social cohesion.
Even as states cede their claim to formal juridical sovereignty in the face 
of growing complexity and interdependence among different functional 
systems, they are also becoming more involved in organizing and 
steering the self-organization of partnerships, networks and governance 
regimes.
The expanded definition of the economic at the expense of the extra-
economic clearly involves a key role for states (on whatever scale) in re-
defining their relations, steering the (re-)commodification of social rela-
tions, and dealing with the repercussions of the increasing dominance of
economic logic in the wider society. Moreover, whereas promoting the
micro-social conditions for economic competitiveness in these changing
circumstances may well be better handled at other levels than the
national, problems of territorial integration, social cohesion, and social
exclusion are currently still best handled through large national states.
Large and rich states still have significant fisco-financial powers and re-
distributive capacities for these purposes – whether they choose to exer-
cise these powers is another matter. Smaller national states require far
greater cohesion to deal with the pressures resulting from globalization
and, without this, they have strong interests to form strategic alliances
with other states and/or enter supranational blocs. 
The emergence of new imagined political communities is too complex
to discuss here because it is shaped by a wide range of processes from
technological change and economic globalization to crises of class and na-
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tional identity and the rise of new social movements. Nonetheless it has
led states to introduce policies to counteract the newly perceived problem
of social exclusion and to seek new bases of legitimation to counteract
threats posed by growing political disenchantment with the prevailing
forms of state. These policies are pursued across different scales and in-
volve multiple agencies but the national state generally retains the leading
metagovernance role in these areas.
Time and Politics
A key dimension of state capacities is their temporal sovereignty, i.e.,
their ability to make decisions according to their own political routines
rather than the temporal rhythms of other systems. Much of the pressure
that state managers feel in the current global era has more to do with the
compression of time than the spatial extension of economic (or other) ac-
tivities. This affects politics as the »art of the possible«. States increasingly
face temporal pressures in policy-making and implementation due to the
acceleration of time and the shortening of time horizons in other social
spheres. In particular, as economic routines of superfast and/or hypermo-
bile capital accelerate, the time available to states to determine and co-or-
dinate political responses to economic events shrinks. This puts pressure
on states to adapt by withdrawing from areas where they are too slow to
make a difference (this pressure is independent of calls from certain forces
to withdraw from such areas), speeding up their routines through fast
policy and fast tracking, or seeking to slow down economic movements.
A laissez-faire retreat could reinforce the impact of deregulated financial
markets, however, especially when market forces provoke economic
crises and states cannot respond quickly. The acceleration of politics is
reflected in the shortening of policy development cycles, fast-tracking de-
cisions, rapid program rollout, continuing policy experimentation, an in-
stitutional and policy Darwinism in which only the quick and effective
survive, and a relentless revision of guidelines and benchmarks. This
acceleration privileges those who can operate within compressed time
scales, narrows the range of participants in policy-making, and limits the
scope and time for deliberation, consultation, and negotiation. This can
significantly affect the choice of policies, the initial targets of policy, the
sites where policy is implemented, and the criteria for success. Fast policy
privileges the executive over the legislature and the judiciary, finance over
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industrial capital, consumption over long-term investment. It is likely to
increase the chances of making decisions on the basis of unreliable infor-
mation, insufficient consultation, lack of participation, etc. It also tends
to destroy institutional memory and to discourage long-term planning.
Hence the present is extended at the expense of both past and future; and
politics is lived in the mediatized world of spin and presentation, the
quick fix, rapid churning of policies, and plebiscitarian forms of demo-
cracy.
Rather than compressing absolute political time, states could create
relative political time by slowing the circuits of capital. The most cele-
brated, if not yet implemented, example of this strategy is the Tobin tax,
which would decelerate the flow of superfast and hypermobile financial
capital and limit its distorting impact on the real economy. Other exam-
ples include a tax on fossil fuels to slow the exhaustion of non-renewable
resources and global warming, inclusion of recycling and disposal costs
in the pricing of goods, and resort to prudential principles in the intro-
duction of new technologies. For these could tilt the balance away from
globalization in favor of regional and local economies, slow the rate of en-
vironmental destruction, and allow proper evaluation of the likely conse-
quences of technological innovation. This could be supplemented by a
fourth political time-management option. This is to establish the institu-
tional framework for guided self-regulation on various scales based on
the principle of subsidiarity as well as for continuous monitoring of how
well such self-regulation is operating in the light of agreed criteria. This
strategy of reflexive metagovernance would enable the state to retain the
capacity to co-ordinate activities across different time zones and tempo-
ralities without the risk of overload.
Conclusions: Post-national Governance 
and the Resilience of the National State
I conclude this review of recent changes in the state with two main sets
of arguments. First, in most advanced capitalist economies, the Keynes-
ian national welfare state is being tendentially replaced by a Schumpeter-
ian post-national workfare regime (spwr). The latter can be presented
along the same ideal-typical lines as the knws. Thus, regarding its eco-
nomic functions, the new state form is Schumpeterian insofar as it tries to
promote permanent innovation and flexibility in relatively open econo-
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mies by intervening on the supply-side and to strengthen their structural
and/or systemic competitiveness. This invokes Schumpeter, the theorist
of innovation, entrepreneurship, and competition, rather than Keynes,
the theorist of money, employment, and national demand, as its emblem-
atic economist. Likewise, as a workfare regime, the spwr subordinates so-
cial policy to the demands of labor market flexibility and employability
and to the demands of economic competition. This includes putting
downward pressure on the social wage qua cost of international pro-
duction but, given the economic and political limits to welfare cuts, it also
involves the reorientation of the inherited welfare state to economic in-
terests. In more neo-liberal economies this leads to the partial dismant-
ling of the welfare state and increasing polarization and social exclusion;
but it is consistent with a more incremental redesign, reorientation, and
rescaling of welfare in other types of economic regimes. In relation to its
economic and social functions, attempts are also made to create appro-
priate subjects to serve as partners in the innovative, knowledge-driven,
entrepreneurial, flexible economy and its accompanying self-reliant, au-
tonomous, empowered workfare regime. 
Regarding the scale on which these functions are performed, the spwr
is »post-national« insofar as the national territory has become less impor-
tant as an economic, political, and cultural »power container«. This is as-
sociated with a transfer of economic and social policy-making functions
upward, downward, and sideways. On a global level, this can be seen in
the growing involvement of a growing number of international agencies
(such as the imf, World Bank, oecd, and ilo) and intergovernmental fo-
rums (such as the g8) in the shaping of current social as well as economic
policy agendas. Other scales of political organization are also increasingly
active in this redesign – including the European Union as an emerging
post-national polity, the emerging global hierarchy of networked cities,
and a growing number of cross-border regions. Finally, the spwr relies
increasingly on forms of governance rather than sovereign state capacities
to compensate for market failures and inadequacies. There is an increased
role for non-state mechanisms in shaping and delivering state-sponsored
economic and social policies. One aspect of this is the increased impor-
tance of private-public networks to state activities on all levels from the
local to the supranational. The shift from government towards govern-
ance means that traditional forms of intervention are less important now
in economic and social policy. This does not mean that law and money
have disappeared, of course; instead, active economic and social steering
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now tends to run more through soft regulation and reflexive law, addi-
tionality and private-public partnerships, organizational intelligence and
information-sharing, etc. A key role is also played by »meta-governance«,
i.e., the organization of the institutional framework and rules for individ-
ual modes of governance and the »calibration« (or re-balancing) of dif-
ferent modes of governance. 
The early stages of Europolity construction were shaped by a tension 
between strategies to develop a supranational European state and 
strategies to confine it to a limited, goal-oriented, and revocable mech-
anism of intergovernmental collaboration. We are now witnessing the 
emergence of the European Union as a complex, self-organizing system 
of multi-level meta-governance. 
My second conclusion relates primarily to the European Union as the
currently most advanced form of post-national political regime that is
committed to a broad range of economic and social tasks within a more
or less integrated political territory. On the one hand, the eu has key roles
in organizing the transition to a Schumpeterian post-national workfare
regime in Europe, in promoting the competitiveness of European eco-
nomic space in a globalizing knowledge-based economy, and in restruc-
turing and defending the European social model in the face of pressures
emanating from more evangelistic neo-liberal economies (most notably
the United States). Moreover, corresponding to the increasingly post-na-
tional nature of contemporary political economy, the eu also acts both as
a relay and a filter for the agenda-shaping efforts of international agencies
(such as the wto and oecd) at the same time as it attempts to shape the
emerging global economic, political, and social agenda and to promote a
distinctive European agenda in regions and countries beyond its borders.
On the other hand, corresponding to these changing economic and po-
litical functions, their expanding territorial scope, and their increasing
functional interdependence, the eu is being reorganized politically as
part of the more general transformation of statehood and politics on a
global scale. The early stages of Europolity construction were shaped by
a tension between strategies to develop a supranational European state
and strategies to confine it to a limited, goal-oriented, and revocable
mechanism of intergovernmental collaboration. We are now witnessing
the emergence of the European Union as a complex, self-organizing sys-
46 Jessop, The Future of the State ipg 3/2003
tem of multi-level meta-governance. This involves a variety of state and
non-state political actors and a variety of non-political actors in a contin-
uing process of meta-constitutional design and meta-governance prac-
tices. This process is concerned to produce appropriate forms of govern-
ment and governance that have variable territorial and functional geo-
metries but are also compatible with the pursuit of longer term economic
and political projects and with some overall coherence and cohesion of
the emerging European regime. This involves complex processes of inter-
scalar management and the calibration of activities on different scales
with careful attention to what tasks are allocated to which scales and the
balance among different modes of governance. This is a distinctive fea-
ture of the European Union and excludes any easy generalization from
the eu case to the other two triads – or vice versa. It is itself a sign that
one should not push globalization too far as a general explanatory frame-
work of recent changes. 
Finally, while globalization and the other challenges mentioned in the
introduction to this essay have undermined the effectiveness of the Key-
nesian national welfare state, a restructured national state remains central
to the effective management of the emerging spatio-temporal matrices of
capitalism and the emerging forms of post- or transnational citizenship.
For national states have become even more important arbiters of the
movement of state powers upward, downward, and lateral; they have be-
come even more important meta-governors of the increasingly complex
multicentric, multiscalar, multitemporal, and multiform world of govern-
ance; and they are actively involved in shaping the forms of international
policy regimes. This is especially clear even in the most advanced case of
state transformation, namely, the emergence of the Europolity as a com-
plex multi-level meta-governance regime. National states are also re-
sponding more or less effectively to the crisis in traditional forms and
bases of national citizenship. Their activities in these respects have far less
to do with globalization in the strongest sense of this polyvalent, promis-
cuous, and controversial word (i.e., the emergence of a borderless plane-
tary economy – an entity widely and rightly regarded as mythical) than
they do with the more general spatio-temporal restructuring of contem-
porary capitalism. And in this regard it is just as important to pay attention
to the temporal dimensions of these transformations as it is to consider
their spatial aspects. For the effectiveness of the exercise of state powers
depends on its command of time as well as space. The changes in the state
reviewed above reflect the complex interrelations between both aspects.
